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INCLUSION IN GROSS ESTATE OF TRUST

1935 the settler
irrevocably conveyed to himself as trustee in trust for his sons corporate stocks,
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which upon termination of the trust were to be distributed to named beneficiaries other than the settlor. The settlor reserved power during his lifetime to
terminate any of the trusts and distn1mte the principal to beneficiaries then
entitled to rec.eive it. Each trust was to continue for fifteen years unless earlier
terminated by the grantor. He retained no power to revest in himself or his
estate any portion of the corpus or income. The Tax Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the reservation of power was
not includible in the gross estate of the decedent. The Tax Commissioner maintained that it should be included and certiorari was granted. Held, reservation
of power was within the coverage of §811 (d) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code, including in decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes property sub- ·
ject to a power to "alter, amend, or revoke." Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Holmes Estate, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 257.
Any discussion of this case involves, of necessity, a consideration of the
Revenue Act of l 936, which enacted, inter alia, the provisions presently found
in § 8 II ( d) 1 and 2 of the Internal Revenue Code.1 The effect of the revision
made at that time was to change the phrase "to alter, amend, or revoke," which
applied to transfers on or prior to Jun.e 22, 1936, to read "to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate" as applied to transfers made after that date. Since the
trust involved in the principal case was created in 1936 and thus not subject
to §811 (d) (1), the question was presented whether the inter vivos trust was
taxable in the decedent's gross estate on the theory that its enjoyment was subject to a reserved power to "alter, amend, or revoke" under §8 I 1 ( d) ( 2). By
analogy to a recent gift tax case, 2 where the right to present enjoyment by the
beneficiaries was made to depend upon their being in a condition wh.ere provision for maintenance and education was a necessity, it would seem that in this
case the right to present enjoyment is dependent upon the contingency that the
settlor will terminate the trust. Such a termination of the trust would constitute an alteration in the enjoyment of the trust property by the beneficiaries.
Supported by the opinion of the House Ways and Means Committee,3 the Court

"§ Sn. Gross Estate.... (d). Revocable Transfers-(1) Transfers after June
22, 1936. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power ••• to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate .... (2) Transfers on or prior to June 22, 1936 ...
through the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, or revoke ...." 26 U.S.C. (1940)
1

§Su.
2
Fondren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499
(1944). Enjoyment was held to be at a future date where an irrevocable trust for
minors provided for distribution when beneficiaries attained certain ages. Trustee
could invade income and corpus of the trust for maintenance and education of beneficiaries if necessity arose. The Court said that since any present enjoyment was contingent, it was a gift of "future interest" in property so that the $5,000 exclusion
allowed by section 504 (b) of the Revenue Act of I 93 2 could not be taken.
3 "Another change made in subsection (a) of section 206 has been to expressly
include a power to terminate along with the powers to alter, amend or revoke ..•
Since in substance the power to terminate is the equivalent of a power to revoke, this
question should be set at rest. Express provision to that effect has been made and it is
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had little difficulty in deciding that it was properly includible. The question as
to whether retention of th.e power to terminate was enough to render the trust
includible in the gross estate had been raised in another case,4 which led to the
revision. It seems clear that decedent's failure to reserve any beneficial int.erest
or power to recapture one was no serious obstacle to inclusion of tha trust in the
gross estate. 5 A power to terminate when all beneficiari.es join in so declaring
is not held a power to "alter, amend, or revoke." 6 But the mere fact that he
could not select new beneficiaries and was limited to changing enjoyment among
the group m.entioned in the trust deed would not place the power outside the
statute.7 Similarly, a power to change the proportions in which descendants
· should take the property has been held such a reservatio~ as to put the trust
property in decedent's gross estat.e. 8 In the Holmes case the surviving issue of
each son should take his shar.e; if a son died, without issue, his share to go pro
rata to the other two sons or their surviving issue per stirpes. The power reserved
allowed the settlor to accelerate enjoyment and to make certain that each of the
sons received a shar:e, a share that he might otherwise never have received had
he died without issue before termination of the trust. Thus it does not involve
too great a stretch of the imagination to say that the power reserved by the
settlor to terminate was a very important power, and one having substantial
economic value. It was clearly a power, in effect, not only to accelerate the
enjoyment of the beneficiaries but, and even more important, he could thus
determine for a certainty that the trust property would be divided among his
sons as they then existed. It has been suggested that ther.e may be some powers
believed that it is· declaratory of existing law. H. Rep. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d sess.
(1936). See also Treasury Regulations 105, §81.20 (1945), stating "Such addition
is considered but declaratory of the meaning of the subdivision prior to the amendment. A power to terminate capable of being so exercised • . • and when otherwise
so exercisible as to effect a change in the enjoyment is the equivalent of a power to
'altar.' "
4
White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66 (1935). While alive, the decedent
conveyed property to l:erself and two others as trustees upon a trust which was terminable by joint action but in which she reserved no power to modify. She resigned but
was later reappointed by .the .other trustees with the consent of the beneficiaries. The
court held the power thus acquired to participate in terminating the trust, not being
reserved by her in the trust instrument, was not a power to "alter, amend, or revoke"
within the meaning of §302(d), Revenue Act 1926.
11
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 451 (1933). The court suggests the reservation was of some value, in that " ... it made. the settlor dominant in
respect of other dispositions of both corpus and income." Id. at 444.
6
Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68 (1935), where it was said
such a provision is just an expression of a condition the law itself imposes. See 2 TRUSTS
RESTATEMENT, §338 (1) (1935).
'I Chickering v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 1st, 1941) 118 F.
(2d) 254, cert. den., 314 U.S. 636, 62 S.Ct.• 69 (1942); Millard v. Maloney, (C.C.A.
3d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 257; Mellon v. Driscoll, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 117 F. (2d)
477.
8
Commission v. Chase National Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 157 at
158: "The power she reserved was not to change the trust provision in a trivial way,
but went right to the heart of them and gave the decedent a substantial though quali-
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retained that are so limited as not to fall within the scope of the Revenue Act.9
But the power retained here is far too substantial in its effect to be held to fall
within such a cat.egory of exempt powers. The power to terminate here was
as great as one to alter the beneficiaries, which would admittedly put the trust
in the gross estate, for the settlor could determine who should divide the trust
corpus rather than leaving it to be determined by survival at the end of the trust
period. Whether considered as a power to effect a change in the enjoyment by
acceleration, or to assure the proportions in which the beneficiaries would share
the trust property, it seems clear that the coun was right in holding that the
power was such as to ·be properly includible in the gross estate of the decedent.
Edward P. Dwyer, Jr., S.Ed.

fied control over the trust property until her death." See Millard v. Maloney, (D.C.
N.J. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 41.
9 Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 at 443, 53 S.Ct. 451 (1933).

